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RECENT CASE NOTES

RECENT CASE NOTES
BILs AND NoTES-CONSIDERATION.-August

16, 1921, appellee, George

Herr, executed his promissory note for $5,000, to the Farmers' Bank of
Newburgh, Indiana. This complaint was by the receiver of the Beech
Grove State Bank, holder of the note, and alleged that the note and interest
was then due and unpaid. The maker filed an answer in ten paragraphs
and a cross complaint, and alleged that he gave the note on the assurance
of J. C. Effinger, cashier of the payee bank, that it would not represent any "
debt to the bank, but that it was given merely to avoid an unfavorable
report by the bank examiner. The note, which was secured by a mortgage
on the maker's property, was made to represdnt some withdrawals the
cashier had made from the cash. A subsequent renewal to the note has
not altered the points of law. The maker's answer contained among others,
a declaration of fraud, but it was without an averment that any official
other than Effinger knew anything of the transaction; an averment of
failure of consideration; and an allegation that the holder was aware of
the failure of consideration and fraud in the making before it became
owner. Held: Judgment for defendants reversed. Jewett v. Herr et ux,
156 N. E. 568-Appellate Court of Indiana, May 17, 1927.
The cashier can not be said to be acting as the agent of the bank in
having this note executed to save him from an embarrassing position. Peckham v. Hendren, 76 Ind. 47, 53, 54. Twin-Lick Oil Company v. Marbury,
91 U. S. 587; Merrick v. The Peru Coal Company, 61 Ill. 472; Gallery v.
National Exchange Bank, 41 Mich. 169; The First Nat. Bank v. Gifford, 47
Iowa 575. The maker's allegation of fraud on the part of the payee bank
and holder failed, since no proof was made showing that any official of the
payee bank was aware of the conditions of the execution and therefore the
inter-relation of the banks does not taint the transfer. Thus, since the
payee's title was not impeached, any knowledge of fraud on part of a subsequent holder does not bar recovery. Thomas v. Ruddell, 66 Ind. 326;
Hereth v. The Merchants' National Bank, 34 Ind. 380; Riley v. Schawaker,
50 Ind. 592; Proctor v. Baldwin, 82 Ind. 376. The consideration that supports this promise to pay, is the benefit to the third party, the cashier, in
saving him from an embarrassing situation in which he found himself with
the bank. This satisfied the well defined rule that the consideration of a
promise need not be a benefit to the promisor, but it may consist of a benefit to a third person or of a detriment to the promisee. Hayes v. Shirk,
167 Ind. 569, 78 N. E. 653; Shaffer v. Ryan, 84 Ind. 140; Raymond v. Pritchard, 24 Ind. 318; Klitzke v. Smith, 91 N. E. 748; 13 Corpus Junes 325,
Sec. 164.
G. R. R.
INSURANCF-WAIVER AND EsToPPEL.-Action by appellee to recover on
a fire insurance policy. From a judgment for appellee, appellant appeals,
assigning as error certain of the court's rulings. Policy expressly provided
that the entire policy should be void if the subject of insurance be personal
property and be or become incumbered by a chattel mortgage. The property was incumbered by two chattel mortgages, but the insurer did not
learn of these until two days after the loss was sustained and did not deny
liability or act in any way until after suit was commenced. Question: Did
failure of insurer to deny liability until after this action was commenced
and costs incurred constitute a "waiver" of the breached condition? Held:
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No. Judgment reversed in favor of appellant. Union Assurance Society,
Lin't. v. Reneer, May 27, 1927. Appellate Court of Indiana, 156 N. E. 833.
Insurance companies have the right to protect themselves, by their contracts, against all breaches of conditions against future incumbrance of the
property insured, without making the validity of the condition depend upon
the question of fact whether the incumbrances actually increased the risk.
Milwaukee Mechanics Insurance Co. v. Niewedde, 12 Ind. App. 145. The
insured is bound to know of provisions of his insurance policy. Blunt W.
Fidelity and Casualty Co., 78 Pac. 729. Waiver involves both knowledge
and intention, one being essential to the other, and requires doing or forbearance to do something inconsistent with the existence of the right or
the intention to rely thereon. Hardin v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins.
Co., 127 $. E. 353. The right to enforce forfeiture of a policy was held
not to be waived, in a non-payment of premium case, by mere silence or
inaction of the insurer. Morgan v. Home Inc. Co., 288 S. W. 321. When
there has been a breach of a condition contained in an insurance policy,
the insurance company may or may not take advantage of such breach and
claim a forfeiture. A waiver can not be inferred from its mere silence.
It is not obligated to do or say anything to make the forfeiture effectual. It
may wait until claim is made under the policy, and then, in denial or in
defense thereof, allege the forfeiture. Titus v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., re-affirmed in Replogel v. The American Insurance Co., 132 Ind. 360. Costs
incurred in litigation are insufficient to constitute the basis of estoppel.
Hughes v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 72 Pac. 452. By the weight of authority the
bringing of a suit or other legal proceeding is not a change of position
within the law of estoppel. Eikenberry v. Edwards, 24 N. Y. 530; Jamison
v. Auxier, 124 N. W. 606-although some of the authorities hold that the
expense of the costs and charges of a suit is sufficient prejudice to support
an estoppel-Ripley v. Priest, 169 Mich. 383. The former view seems the
better and the decision of this case correct.
R. W. M.
MASTER AND SERVANT-ASSUMPTION OF RISK.-Action for damages sustained by appellee while in appellant's employ. P. alleged injury caused
by negligence of appellant in placing its tracks with insufficient clearance.
D. pleads assumption of risk. Appellee engaged in interstate commerce and
case comes under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Compiled
Statutes, Sections 8657 and 8665), which retains the doctrine of assumption
of risk, where no safety appliances are involved. Appellant's tracks were
constructed so close together that appellee, a conductor, while in the performance of his duty, was crushed and injured by a passing train, while
descending from the top of a box car. Appellee had been in appellants
employ for several years and appellants contend that proximity of tracks
was so open to appellee's observation, that he assumed the risk of being
injured by remaining in their employ. Evidence that proximity of tracks
was peculiar to the place, that such condition had not been called to appellee's attention or that he had discovered same. Held: Jd. for P. New
York, C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Peele. Indiana Appellate Court, June 17,
1927. 157 N. E. 106.
Sections 8657 and 8665 of the U. S. Compiled Statutes do not abolish
the defense of assumption of risk, save where the carrier's violation of
some federal statute enacted for the safety of employees has contributed to
the injury or death. Southern Ry. Co. v. Howerton, 105 N. E. 1025. Where
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the injury results from the employer's negligence and not from the violation of the statute, the doctrine applies and the employee assumes all ordinary risks and danger incident to the employment, including those resulting
from the master's negligence, which are known to him or which are open
and apparent and would have been known to a person of ordinary prudence and care. Mechem, sec. 1662; Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St.
L. Ry. Co. v. Belange, 78 Ind. App. 37. However it is not obligatory upon
the employee to search for defects or to make a critical inspection of the
tools and appliances which the employer provides for his use. Baltimore
& Ohio Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 161 Ind. 1; M. Rumely Co. v. Myer,
40 Ind. App. 460. But he can assume his employer has exercised due care
to provide a reasonable and safe place for him to work and he therefore
does not assume risks which are not ordinarily incident to his employment
unless he has actual knowledge of such danger or unless the circumstances
are such as to charge him with knowledge of same. The Pittsburg, Cincinnati& St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Adams, 105 Ind. 151; Brazil Block & Coal Co.
v. Gibson, 160 Ind. 319. The case was rightly decided in accordance with
the construction placed upon the federal Employers' Liability Act, by the
decisions of this and other jurisdictions.
R. H. L.
MASTER AND SERVANT - NEGLIGENcE - CO-EMPLOYEES. - Plaintiff employed by defendant to pitch back hay in mow after it was brought there
by a hayfork. Plaintiff directed to go and get hay unloaded. Plaintiff
handled fork and co-employee drove horses, used to draw hay up. Plaintiff's hand caught and seriously injured when horses were started. Plaintiff
had not handled fork before. Plaintiff seeks damages for personal injuries. Alleged that defendant knew co-employee was inexperienced and
incompetent, and that defendant was negligent in employing and retaining
him and that defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.
Error assigned in refusal to instruct that burden was on plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of evidence, the incompetence of co-employee and
defendant's knowledge thereof; and that plaintiff must be free from contributory negligence. Held: Reversed for defendant. Noblesville Milling
Co. v. Witham. Appellate Court of Indiana, May 18, 1927. 156 N. E. 522.
The holding is well supported by decisions. A master is not liable to
a servant for injuries caused by negligence of fellow servant unless the
master was guilty of negligence in the employment of the co-employee or,
after notice, continues in his service the incompetent or negligent employee; and such negligence must be averred in the complaint. Mechem
1644; Bogard v. Louisville, Evansville, and St. Louis Ry. Co., 100 Ind.
491; Ohio and Mississippi Ry. Co. v. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261; Boyce v. Fitzpatrick, 80 Ind. 526. A master is not liable when work is not dangerous,
where he has used proper care to employ competent servants, and used
proper appliances. Dill v. Marmon, 164 Ind. 508; Pitt., Cinn., & St. L. Ry.
Co. v. Adams, 105 Ind. 151.
An employee impliedly contracts to assume perils of injury from coemployees where employer is free from negligence. Evansville and Richmond Ry. Co. v. Henderson, 134 Ind. 636; Pitt., Cinn. & St. L. Ry. Co. v.
Adams, 105 Ind. 151. Employee has no cause of action if his own negligence directly contribute. Mechem 1675; N. Y., Chi. & St. L. Ry. Co. v.
Hamlin, 170 Ind. 20.
Where the court directs a particular verdict on a finding of certain
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facts, instructions must contain all facts and conditions essential to verdict.
Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Mathews, 177 Ind. 88; American
Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Buoy, 43 Ind. A. 501. Instructions should not
ignore an affirmative defense which, if supported by evidence, would defeat
recovery.
A. L. B.
WATER CouRsEs-OBsTRucTIoN

OF FLOW OF WATER IN NATURAL CHAN-

NEL-INJUNCTION.-This was an action by appellee for a mandatory injunction to remove a dam built across the bed of a natural watercourse.
It is alleged that the stream was a natural watercourse and had been from
time immemorial, that by the construction of the dam the lands of appellee
would be practically destroyed as to value. Appellant contends that theie
is.nothing in the findings that show appellee would not have an adequate
at law. Held: Judgment affirmed for appellee. The findings as a whole
show a natural watercourse in appellee's land, the obstruction thereof as
it passes into appellant's land, and that such an obstruction will result in
damages to appellee. It is a well settled rule that the right to an unobstructed flow of water in its natural channel will be protected by injunction. Foster v. Malsbary, Appellate Court of Indiana, July 1, 1927. 157
N. E. 446.
The problem of this case seems not to be the application of the rules of
obstruction and detention of water, but that of whether equity can and will
give relief to the appellee, in these watercourse cases, as the appellant
points out in his contention that there is adequate remedy at law. If it were
the former the case might present some difficulty in the application of the
rules of reasonable obstruction and detention of water. It is well settled
that the appellee as a riparian proprietor has a right to the unobstructed
flow of the water through his land subject to a reasonable use in other
riparian owners. Dilling v. Murray, 6 Ind. 324; Mitchell v. Parks, 26 Ind.
354; Case v. Weber, 2 Ind. 108. That bei'ng so, it is also well-settled that
courts of equity have jurisdiction to grant relief where one, obstructing the
natural flow of the watercourse does damage to another. Dilling v. Murray, 6 Ind. 324; Detarding v. Central, etc. Service Ca., 313 Ill. 562. Both
authority and sound principles support the holding of the case. "Where
the obstruction in a watercourse constitutes a permanent and irremediable
injury to the rights of a riparian owner, he is not confined to an action for
damages, but may, on a proper showing, have a decree ordering the removal or abatement of the obstruction. Law and equity exercise concurrent
jurisdiction in cases of injuries to riparian rights by interference with the
course of a stream, but equity furnishes the more adequate remedy because
it prevents the multiplicity of suits."-40 Cyc. 577-Fahnestockv. Feldner,
98 Md. 335. Further, equity furnishes the more adequate remedy when
it is shown that an obstruction will cause irreparable injury, present or
threatened, for which an action at law will not furnish the adequate remedy.
Barrows v. Fox, 30 Pac. 768; Janesville v. Carpenter,77 Wis. 288.
P. A. L.
WILLS-CONTRACT To DEWSE-REMFnY FOR BREACH.-Action to enjoin
appellee from violating a contract made by her and appellant by which
appellee agreed to execute her last will, in and by which she would devise
and bequeath to appellant.in case he should survive her, and to his children,
in case he should predecease her, all her property with some minor excep-
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tions. After said agreement was made, appellee executed her will as per
contract. Appellee now repudiates the contract and seeks to revoke the will
made in accordance therewith. The consideration given by P. in exchange
for D.'s promise has been executed. Judgment for D. in lower court reversed on appeal. Petition for rehearing. Hed: A contract to make a will
is valid and enforceable and an action to enjoin breach ot a contract to
will property is a specific way may be maintained during the lifetime of
the promisor. Lovett v. Lovett, Indiana Appellate Court, June 17, 1927,
157 N. E. 104.
A promise upon a valid consideration to will property is a valid contract
and an action will lie for its breach against the personal representative of
the promisor or, in the proper case, by a bill in the nature of specific performance against his heirs, devisees, or personal representative. Roehl v.
Haumesser, 114 Ind. 311; Caviness v. Rushton, 101 Ind. 500; Johnson v.
Hubbell, 10 N. J. Eq. 332; Woods v. Matloclk, 19 Ind. App. 364. If the
promisor has renounced the contract during his lifetime, or has conveyed
the property, or has made performance on his part impracticable, the
weight of authority holds that such repudiation does not give rise to a
cause of action for damages during the life of the promisor. Warden v.
Hinds, 163 Fed. 201; Manning v. Pippen, 86 Ala. 357; Gordon v. Spellman,
89 S. E. 749. However, most jurisdictions hold that upon such repudiation the promisee, if he has substantially performed, may sue in equity
to establish the contract and to prevent a conveyance of the property to
another. Teske v. Dittberner, 70 Nebr. 444; Duvale v. Duvale, 54 N. J.
Eq. 581; Chentland v. Sherman, 148 Iowa 352; Van Horn v. Dunarest, 77
N. J. Eq. 264. The above decisions hold that an agreement to leave property by will cannot be rescinded by act of the promisor unless the promisee
consents thereto, and that to deny relief to the promisee would be an intolerable fraud which a court of equity will not permit. If the remedy at
law is inadequate, the breach, although anticipatory, should justify equitable relief on the principle of quia tinnet. The decision in the present case
is supported by well established authority and appears to be a correct
application of the law.
H. C. L.

